US-led International Critical Minerals Agreements and the EU’s Clean Energy Transition Measures
I presented a paper titled "US-led International Critical Minerals Agreements and the EU’s Clean Energy Transition Measures: Managing Structural Supply Chain Risks" at the International Conference on “Critical Transitions: Governing Minerals, Energy Transitions, and Climate Futures” 15 - 16 September 2026, organised by the University of Lapland’s Law, Technology and Sustainability Transitions research group.
The paper examines the emerging trend toward plurilateralism and US-led agreements aimed at diversifying supply chains for critical raw minerals (CRM), addressing structural risks along the CRM value chain, and their implications for the EU's clean energy technology measures.
Energy systems and the electrification of things are key drivers of rising demand for CRMs such as aluminium, cobalt, copper, graphite (carbon), lithium, magnesium, nickel, platinum, silicon, and certain rare earth elements. These essential minerals and materials also play a vital role across strategic sectors including high-tech, aerospace and defence. The typical CRM value chain comprises (i) upstream exploration and mining, (ii) midstream refining and processing, (iii) downstream, in which CRMs are essential inputs for manufacturing various products and technologies, and (iv) recycling. As at 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounted for 74% of global cobalt mine production, Indonesia for 67% of global nickel mine production and China for 69% of rare earth mine production. In the midstream, China dominates refining for rare earths, lithium and cobalt, while Indonesia accounts for 43% of global nickel refining capacity.
Given the structural dynamics of the global CRM value chain, countries need to secure and diversify sources of supply, build domestic production and processing capacity where feasible, and promote recycling through coordinated policy measures and investments. Consequently, economies such as the EU enacted the Critical Raw Materials Act while pursuing international strategic partnerships and arrangements. In the US, after assessing the risks and threats posed by significant reliance on imports for refined/processed CRMs, the US Office of the Trade Representative (USTR) initiated processes to establish a legally binding Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Critical Minerals. Recent initiatives such as the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE), the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework between the US, Japan, Australia, and India, the 2026 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a proposed plurilateral deal on critical minerals trade and investment between the US and EU all reflect the new move towards plurilaterals.
Generally, plurilaterals are multiparty, sector-specific agreements developed within an international organisation or broader multilateral agreement, and entered into by a subset of the overall membership. A subset of countries, sometimes drawn from the full membership of organisations such as the WTO, negotiate agreements on specific issues when progress through universal multilateral consensus is unlikely or impossible. Although these plurilaterals provide an avenue for harmonising regulations and strategic objectives of 'like-minded' parties, they can also sideline non-parties and create potential implications under existing structures such as WTO rules and Free Trade Agreements from an international economic law perspective. It would also be important to consider how these agreements can serve as a tool for guaranteeing ESG standards and rules for responsibly sourced materials.
Key features of emerging frameworks being developed for a more resilient and secure CRM value chain involving the US, the EU, and others include border-adjusted price floors (tariffs designed to protect "allied" markets against artificially cheap imports) and offtake agreements for facilitating long-term purchase and supply from 'new' mines and refineries.
The following are slides of the paper presentation-
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